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Articles

I
The Economics o f the Gulag
By Michael P. Gallen

The Soviet prison camp system, known as the Gulag, played a major role in the
Soviet economy from 1929 to 1953. Gulag inmates worked in various branches of Soviet
industry, including lumbering, mining, and construction, often in remote regions with
harsh climates. The Soviet leadership saw the Gulag as a means to enforce state
economic policy and develop the frontiers of the Soviet Union. However, the camps
proved to be economically harmful because they wasted manpower and resources,
straining the Soviet economy. Furthermore, to ensure their own survival, inmates
frequently engaged in various forms of resistance, such as faking work results and selfmutilation, which disrupted camp production. Ultimately, the drawbacks of the Gulag
system of forced labor far outweighed its advantages.
During the early years of the Soviet Union, the prison system played only a minor
role in the economy. In 1918, the People’s Commissariat of Justice issued a resolution,
“On Prison Worker Teams,” which had called for prisoners to perform hard labor in
government projects. Another resolution, “On Deprivation of Liberty as a Measure of
Punishment and Procedures for Its Implementation,” issued later that year, allowed the
creation of workplaces intended especially for prisoners. Prison workplaces were
established across the country, with 352 workshops and 18 farms run by the Chief
Administration of Forced Labor (GUPR).i Nevertheless, only forty percent of all
prisoners worked during most of the 1920s.ii The early camps did not contribute to the
New Economic Policy, and required increasing subsidies from the central government to
remain functional, iii
In 1929, however, steps were taken to establish the prison camps as a major
economic force. In June, the Politburo released a resolution entitled “On the Use of
Prison Labor,” which called for all prisoners with sentences of three or more years to be
transferred to camps governed by the OGPU. iv Then, in October, the First All-Union
Conference of the Prison Agency of the People’s Commissariats of the Interior
proclaimed:
1 Galina Mikhailovna Ivanova. Labor Camp Socialism: The Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian System.
Donald J. Raleigh, ed. Carol Flath, trans. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 2000. pp. 69-70.
” John L. Scherer and Michael Jakobson, “The Collectivization o f Agriculture and the Soviet Prison Camp
System,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, 1993. pp. 534-535.
III Ivanova, Socialism, p. 70, and Scherer and Jakobson, “Collectivization,” p. 535.
IVDavid J. Nordlander, “Origins of A Gulag Capital: Magadan and Stalinist Control in the Early 1930s,”
Slavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, Winter 1998. p. 795.
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The Five Year Plan of industrial development and the collectivization of
agriculture established economic tasks involving great demand for unskilled labor. Local
conditions [bad climate and shortages of food and housing] sometimes present serious
obstacles to the recruitment of labor. It is here that the place of confinement, having at
their disposal excess labor in great quantities which is not engaged in production near
places of confinement, can assist those economic enterprises which experience labor
shortages, v
The new emphasis on forced labor was a response to conditions associated with
the Five Year Plans. First, with increased industrialization, there was a marked rise in the
need for workers. A conference of the Commissariat of Labor in February 1930 reported
that the forestry and construction industries faced shortages of workers numbering in the
hundreds of thousands.vi For example, in the Urals region alone, the forestry industry
would require more than 500, 000 workers in 1929 and 1930.Matters were further
complicated by the terrible conditions at many civilian work camps. Workers faced
inadequate food and housing, and frequently fled their jobs.vii Many industrial officials
saw forced labor camps as a means to correct this problem. As James R. Harris notes,
“They tended to see the solution to the problem in the camp system, not in transforming
their entire factories into labor colonies, but rather in using forced labor for those jobs
with particularly harsh conditions, from which the rate of ‘leakage’ (utechka) was
especially high.”™ Prison camps would provide workers who could not run away.
Simultaneously, there was a massive inflow of prisoners into the Soviet judicial
system. The collectivization drive associated with the First Five Year Plan was resisted
by millions of peasants who horded their grain. The Soviet regime responded with harsh
measures:
To break the kulaks’ resistance, the regime revived, in effect, the old Czarist
tradition of the administrative deportation order. From one day to the next,
trucks and wagons simply arrived in a village and picked up entire families.
Some kulaks were shot; some were arrested and given camp sentences.ix
Although the majority of peasants were exiled, at least 100,000 of them were
sentenced to service in the forced labor camps.x To deal with this massive influx of new
inmates, the OGPU created a new division called the Main Administration of Corrective
Labor Camps and Labor Settlements on April 7, 1930. Originally known by the acronym
GUITLP, which proved to be unpronounceable for many bureaucrats, its name was
shortened to Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei or Main Camp Administration, known by the
acronym GULAG.xi
v Scherer and Jakobson, “Collectivization,” p. 538.
vl James R. Harris, “The Growth of the Gulag: Forced Labor in the Urals Region, 1929-31,” Russian
Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, April 1997. pp. 266-267.
pp. 270 and 272.
™Ibid, p. 270.
“ Anne Applebaum. Gulag: A History. New York: Doubleday, Random House, 2003. p. 47.
*Ibid.

Xl Ibid, p. 656, and Scherer and Jakobson, “Collectivization,” p. 540.
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Initially, the efforts of Gulag prisoners were focused on the forestry industry.
Starting with a July 1929 order to the OGPU, camps were established to harvest forests in
remote regions. For instance, in the northern regions o f the Urals, there were unexplored
forests that could supplement the supply of timber from previously harvested forests
whose lumber supply had been exhausted.xii However, in 1930 and 1931, Great Britain
and the United States began to boycott Soviet goods that had been manufactured with
forced labor. In America, the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibited the importation of products
created with the use of “Convict labor or / and forced labor,” resulting in the barring of
Soviet matches and pulpwood from American borders.xiii Because lumber and wood
products had been major Soviet exports since 1925, the Soviet government shifted
forestry work from Gulag prisoners to exiled peasants. The stage was set for Gulag labor
to expand into heavy industry.™
One area of heavy industry dominated by Gulag labor was mining. The Gulag
established camps in remote regions of the Soviet Union to mine various metals. The
most infamous mining camps were part of the Glavnoe upraylenie stroitel 'siva Dal 'nego
Severa NKVD SSSR or Far Northern Construction Trust, known by its acronym Dalstroi.
As David Nordlander notes, “The construction of labor camps around Magadan occurred
for one reason—the presence of huge gold reserves throughout the region.”xv Prisoners in
Kolyma and other Dalstroi camps extracted gold from the frozen ground. The Dalstroi
system as a whole, which covered an area larger than Western Europe, extracted 14, 458
kilograms of pure gold in 1935 and 33,360 kilograms in 1936. Gold was a valuable
economic resource for the Soviet Union because it could be sold in exchange for foreign
currency to support the industrialization effort, xvi
Another important mining camp was the Norilsk Correctional Labor Camp, also
known as Norillag. This camp was dedicated to extracting the minerals of the Norilsk
region, which included nickel, copper, cobalt, and platinum. Nickel was used in making
steel, while the other metals became important in later years. This camp proved to be one
of the most profitable of the Gulag system. As Simon Ertz writes:
According to 1939 data, Norilsk’s deposits of nickel made up “48 percent of all
deposits in the USSR and 22 percent of world deposits, not including the
USSR.” Copper deposits equaled “10 percent of USSR deposits and 2 percent of
world deposits.” According to an October 1938 report, platinum deposits
“.. .appear to equal 549,780 tons, which puts them in first place in USSR and
accords them status of world significance.”xvii
x" Harris, “Growth," p. 271 and Scherer and Jakobson, “Collectivization,” p. 537.
xl" Applebaum, Gulag, p. 60.
xlv Scherer and Jakobson, “Collectivization,” p. 538.
xv David Nordlander, “Origins of a Gulag Capital: Magadan and Stalinist Control in the Early 1930s,”
Slavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, Winter 1998. p. 794.
Magadan was a newly constructed city around which the Dalstroi camp system was centered.
XV1David Nordlander, “Magadan and the Economic History of the Dalstroi in the 1930s,” in The Economics
o f Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag. Paul R. Gregory and Valery Lazarev, eds. Hoover Institution Press,
2003. pp. 108 and 110.

xv“ Simon Ertz, “Building Norilsk,” in Economics, pp. 129-130.
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The Gulag also became involved in major construction projects. Some of these
projects were meant to provide infrastructure for various Gulag camps. For example,
during the first two years of the Dalstroi camp system’s existence, prisoners’ efforts
focused on constructing its capital city, Magadan, as well as a highway to provide
transportation to the gold mines.xviii Other construction projects, however, were
independent entities not associated with any other camps. For example, the White SeaBaltic Canal was constructed by prisoners from the Belomor-Baltiiskii Labor Camp or
Belbaltlag between 1931 and 1933. The canal extended for 141 miles, connecting die
Baltic Sea near Leningrad to the White Sea near Kern. It permitted ships carrying lumber
and minerals from the White Sea region to travel to the commercial ports in the Baltic
Sea, thus easing the transport problems of the Soviet regime.xix
The Soviet government did not consider the work of these camps to be their only
economic benefit. The Gulag was also seen as a convenient method to develop the
resources of the Soviet Union’s most isolated regions. In order to develop the Kolyma
and Norilsk regions, the government needed workers to augment the short labor supply in
these under-populated territories. Unfortunately, bringing in free workers was difficult
and expensive. For example, the Soviet government launched a campaign to develop the
Norilsk mining region in 1930, but had only succeeded in attracting 500 workers there by
1933.xx Free workers who chose to serve in such isolated regions had to receive extra
benefits in compensation for the hardships they faced. Free workers in Norilsk in the late
1940s received extra pay, a six month paid vacation, and free transport to and from the
mining camps.xxi To Soviet economic planners, it seemed easier to use forced labor than
to attract workers to harsh, distant regions.
The Soviet government also used the Gulag as a means to maintain workplace
discipline in the civilian labor market. Criminal punishments were introduced for various
infractions in the workplace. As Andrei Solokov notes:
In January of 1939, the Council of People’s Commissars decreed that tardiness
of 20 minutes or more constituted an unauthorized absence from work. On June
26, 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet approved the decree “On the
transition to an eight hour work day, a seven day work week, and the prohibition
of voluntary departures of workers from enterprises and institutions.” The June
1940 law tied the worker to the enterprise and introduced criminal punishments
for laziness, poor discipline, and tardiness. In August of 1940, criminal
punishments were introduced for minor workforce infractions, such as
drunkenness, hooliganism, and petty theft, xxii
x,ul Simon Ertz, “Building Norilsk,” in Economics, pp. 129-130.
’tlx Nordlander, “Origins,” p. 808.
“ Applebaum, Gulag, pp. 59, 62-63 and Ivanova, Socialism, p. 76.
Ertz, “Building Norilsk,” in Economics, p. 128.
Leonid Borodkin and Simon Ertz, “Coercion versus Motivation: Forced Labor in Norilsk,” in
Economics, p. 83.
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Arresting workers for minor disciplinary infractions was a drastic method for
making Soviet workers give their maximum effort. Although most workers never
experienced this, as John L. Scherer and Michael Jakobson note, “It did not really matter
how many people were arrested for being inefficient or tardy. What mattered was that the
government did arrest people for these actions, and people knew that this might be their
fate.” xxiii Deportation to the Gulag substituted for the capitalist practice of firing a
worker.
A term in the Gulag was not a punishment reserved for blue collar workers.
Soviet managers could face sentences to the camps if they failed to meet the goals set by
their production plans. Failures to fulfill the plan, called proryv, resulted in a search for
scapegoats who could be blamed and punished, sometimes by deportation to the
Gulag.xxiv This became common during the Great Terror of 1937 and 1938:
In an inspection trip of August-October 1938 to investigate plan failures in coal
mining, NKTP’s deputy director, a Comrade Makarov, inspected various coal
mines and heard reports from the field director and from directors of different
mines. After evaluating these reports, he declared that mines with 35 percent
fulfillment were doing “disgraceful work,” those with 40-60 percent fulfillment
were doing “definitely bad work,” and those with 85 percent fulfillment were
doing “unsatisfactory work.” Makarov identified the reasons for failure, placed
blame on specific individuals, and suggested remedies. He was also authorized
to levy punishment. He turned some mine directors over to the courts for
punishment •XXV
To the Soviet leadership, the Gulag system seemed to be an economic boon to
their country. It was a productive part of the mining and construction industries which
allowed them to develop the resources of the most isolated regions of the Soviet Union
without much expense. At the same time, it provided a tool for ensuring workplace
discipline. However, the Gulag system actually suffered from severe economic
disadvantages. It was wasteful in its use of human and material resources, and its
coercive methods drove prisoners to try to circumvent the system in order to survive.
The Gulag often wasted its most precious resource, its workers, before they even
reached the camps. Because the camps were an organ of the Soviet state, their labor
supply was subject to the policies of the Soviet government. They received their inmates
from the Soviet courts, which would often sentence people to death for political reasons,
without regard to the service they could provide to the camps. As Oleg Khlevnyuk writes,
“A significant part of [those executed] were able-bodied men, highly qualified specialists
and workers, who were constantly in short supply at NKVD projects.”xxvi
“ m Scherer and Jakobson, “Collectivization,” p. 540.
Paul R. Gregory and Andrei Markevich, “Creating Soviet Industry: The House That Stalin Built,”
Slavic Review, Vol. 61, No. 4, Winter 2002. p. 800.
m Ibid, pp. 800-801.
Oleg Khlevnyuk, “The Economy of the OGPU, NKVD, and MVD of the USSR, 1930-1953: The Scale,
Structure, and Trends of Development,” in Economics, p. 49.
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Statistics from Leningrad alone illustrate the deleterious effects of these executions on the
Gulag workforce. 26.3 percent of the people executed in Leningrad between August and
October 1937 were rabochie, members of the working class who could have been
effective hard laborers for the Gulag. Even more of the condemned, 30.9 percent, were
sluzhashchie, members of a broad group that included the technical personnel so valuable
in Gulag operations .xxvii
The conditions within the Gulag camps also resulted in much waste of human
resources. Prisoners often contended with such wretched living conditions that they
quickly became unable to do productive work. While a complete analysis of conditions
within the Gulag is beyond the scope of this essay, one major contributor to the decline of
prisoners’ working ability was the camps’ tiered ration system. Under this system, the
amount of food an inmate received was determined by his or her work output. This
system, devised by a former prisoner turned guard, Naftaly Frenkel, became standard for
all the Gulag camps. According to Anne Applebaum:
He divided the prisoners of SLON into three groups according to their physical
abilities: those deemed capable of heavy work, those capable of light work, and
invalids. Each group received a different set of tasks, and a set of norms to
fulfill. They were then fed accordingly—and the differences between their
rations were quite drastic. One chart, drawn up between 1928 and 1932, allotted
800 grams of bread and 80 grams of meat to the first group; 500 grams of bread
and 40 grams of meat to the second group; and 400 grams of bread and 40 grams
of meat to the third group. The lowest category of workers, in other words,
received half as much food as the highest.. .Fed relatively well, the strong
prisoners grew stronger. Deprived of food, the weak prisoners grew weaker, and
eventually became ill or died. xxviii
As a result o f the conditions in the Gulag, millions of prisoners died, depriving the
camps of valuable workers. The numbers of inmates estimated to have died in the Gulag
vary widely. The NKVD records of the number of deaths in the Gulag are extremely
unreliable because efforts were made to conceal the true number of victims by camp
commanders who feared reprimand from their superiors. xxix For instance, J. Arch Getty,
Gabor Rittersporn, and Victor Zemskov acknowledge only 200,000 deaths resulting from
the camps between 1937 and 1939, while Robert Conquest estimates that deaths in that
period ranged from 1.6 million to 2.6 million victims.xxx
xxxv" Melanie Ilic, “The Great Terror in Leningrad: A Quantitative Analysis,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52,
No. 8, December 2000. pp. 1521-1524.
It should be noted that the sluzhashchie was an extremely broad group which included, aside from
technicians, judges, artists, and actors. Thus, not all of those executed who belonged to this group would
have represented a material loss to the Gulag. Ibid, p. 1523.
Applebaum, Gulag, p. 36.
Frenkel, a prisoner of the Solovoki Camp during the twenties, developed plans for a self-sufficient camp
system that earned him the kudos of Soviet authorities. He eventually became head of the economic section
o f the Special-Purpose Camps. Ivanova, Socialism, p. 77.
Camp commanders would often release dying prisoners so that they would not have to report them on
their mortality statistics. Ibid, p. 583.
Steven Rosefielde, “Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced
Labor, and Economic Growth in the 1930s,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 6, September 1996. p. 962.
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Statistics compiled by the Gulag itself indicate that roughly five percent of its
population died in many years, although, once again, these statistics may be
incomplete.xxxi Despite the differences in numbers, the statistics all point to the same
conclusion: the Gulag lost many workers through starvation and other factors, and did not
make the best use of its human resources.
The Gulag also wasted its mechanical resources. It had little capacity to use the
equipment it was provided with. First, it often lacked the resources to properly use the
equipment. For instance, one dispatch from a camp reads: “Wrecking in Kargopollag:
tractors were sent, but no oil; but our camp chief is resourceful: he can get the tractors to
run without oil.”xxxii Problems such as this damaged the equipment, reducing its life-span.
Furthermore, in many cases the Gulag camps lacked people competent to run the
machinery necessary for a task. At one camp factory, an official reported that “... An
imported 320 kilowatt transformer has been standing idle for two year because...no one
has been able to figure out what it is for.”xxxiii Varlam Shalamov satirized the
incompetence of many camp officials in dealing with machinery in his short story, “The
Injector.” In this story, an engineer writes to the Director of Mines asking for a new
boiler injector to thaw the ground. The old one he has been working with has ceased
working. The Director, however, misinterprets the problem, as is evident from his
response:
1. For refusing to work for five days and thus interfering with the production
schedule, Convict Injector is to be placed under arrest for three days without
permission to return to work and is to be transferred to a work gang with a
penal regime.
2. I officially reprimand Chief Engineer Gorev for a lack of discipline in the
production area. I suggest that Convict Injector be replaced with a civilian
employee.xxxiv
Although this story is an exaggeration, it still makes the valid point that many
administrators in the Gulag did not understand the machinery used in their work, and
consequently did not properly maintain it.
The Gulag also suffered from various forms of inmate resistance, which impeded
its productivity. To escape the harsh conditions of the Gulag environment, inmates
developed various strategies to protect themselves. For example, there was the
widespread practice of tufta, or cheating the boss. The object of tufta was to give Gulag
officials the impression that one was doing the required amount of work, when one was
actually doing far less. Tufta could be committed on an individual level, or on a collective
level such as a work brigade or even an entire camp. It ranged from some prisoners
putting a stone in a bag to make it seem as if it is filled with dwarf cedar needles, as in
Shalamov’s story “A Pushover Job,” to falsifying the work records of a camp.xxxv
"“ 'Applebaum, Gulag, pp. 582-583.
xxx" Ivanova, Socialism, p. 89.
xxxiii Ibid, p. 91.
“ x,v Varlam Shalamov, Kolyma Tales, John Glad, trans. London: Penguin Books, 1994. p. 49.

xxxv Applebaum, Gulag, pp. 350 and 359, and Shalamov, Kolyma, pp. 29-30.
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This type of resistance not only deprived the camp of work, but it also distorted
the production figures of the entire camp system, making it impossible for economic
planners to truly gauge its effectiveness. As Anne Applebaum comments, the production
figures of the Gulag system are, on the whole, “meaningless.”xxxvi
Other inmates resorted to more extreme methods to avoid performing hard labor.
The most gruesome was the practice of samorub, or self-mutilation. Gulag inmates
deliberately injured themselves in an attempt to escape from work or even to leave the
camp. Many inmates believed that if they were rendered invalids, they would be granted
an amnesty and be allowed to leave the camp.xmii Shalamov described how one inmate
injured himself to escape work in his short story, “The Businessman”:
While the work gang is being issued tools, we take a burning log from the fire
and go behind a heap of mined rock. We stand shoulder to shoulder, and all
three of us hold the capsule— each with his right hand. We light the fuse and—
Zap!—fingers fly everywhere.xxxviii
Blowing up a hand was only one way of committing samorub. Inmates developed
a variety of methods including rubbing acid in one’s eyes, deliberately infecting cuts, and
burning oneself. In committing these acts of self-mutilation, inmates not only harmed
themselves; they harmed the camp as an economic institution. First, they were depriving
the camp of their labor by injuring themselves. Second, because they would be punished
with a second camp term, these inmates were a drain on the camp’s resources, eating
food and using the camp’s facilities without performing any meaningful labor. The
problem became serious enough that Gulag administrators felt compelled to issue a
proclamation stating that invalids would not be freed. Although the majority of prisoners
did not go to these lengths to avoid work, those who did were a burden on the Gulag
economy, xxxix
Ultimately, the Gulag system weakened the Soviet economy rather than
strengthening it. Although it provided an attractive means for harvesting the resources of
isolated regions and enforcing workplace discipline, its benefits were offset by its
inefficiency and waste of human and mechanical resources. Ultimately, the Gulag stands
as a testimony to the failure of the Soviet command economy.
Applebaum, Gulag, p. 360.
xxxvii Ibid, pp. 377-378.
xxxv"' Shalamov, Kolyma, pp. 323-324.
Applebaum, Gulag, pp. 377-379.
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